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“An environment characterized by safe attitudes and 
behaviors modeled by leaders and embraced by all that 
fosters an atmosphere of open communication, mutual 
trust, shared safety values and lessons, and confidence 
that we will balance challenges and risks consistent with 






An effective safety culture is characterized by 
the following subcomponents:
Reporting Culture
We report our concerns
Just Culture
We have a sense of fairness
Flexible Culture
We change to meet new demands
Learning Culture
We learn from our successes and mistakes
Engaged Culture



























































































































































































































































































































































High – Mitigate; implement new 
processes, change requirements, 
or re-baseline
Moderate – Manage/consider 
alternative processes, or Accept
















Expected to happen.  Controls have minimal to no effect.
Likely to happen.  Controls have significant limitations or 
uncertainties.
Could happen.  Controls exist, with some limitations or 
uncertainties.
Not expected to happen.  Controls have minor limitations 
or uncertainties.












CONSEQUENCE Subcategories 1 2 3 4 5
Personnel Minor injury;             
Minor OSHA violation
Short-term injury; Moderate 
OSHA violation
Long-term injury, impairment 
or incapacitation;           
Signif icant OSHA violation
Permanent injury or 
incapacitation;               
Major OSHA violation
Loss of life
System, Facility Minor damage to asset
Moderate impact or 
degraded performance Loss of non-critical asset Damage to a critical asset
Loss of critical asset or 
emergency evacuation
Environment
Minor or non-reportable 
hazard or incident
Moderate hazard or 
reportable violation
Signif icant violation; Event 
requires immediate 
remediation
Major violation; Event causes 
temporary w ork stoppage Catastrophic hazard
TECHNICAL Performance
Minor impact to mission 
objectives or 
requirements
Incomplete compliance w ith 
a key mission objective
Noncompliance; Signif icant 
impact to mission
Noncompliance; Major impact 
on Center or Spaceflight 
mission
Failure to meet mission 
objectives
Infrastructure
Minor impact or reduced 
effectiveness 
Moderate impact or damage 
to infrastructure
Significant damage to 
infrastructure or reduced 
support
Mission delays or major 
impacts to Center operations
Extended loss of critical 
capabilities
Workforce
Minor impact to human 
capital
Moderate impact to human 
capital
Signif icant impact; Loss of 
critical skill Major impact; Loss of skill set Loss of Core Competency
COST Organizational or CMO Impact
<2% Budget increase or 
<$1M CMO Threat
2-5% Budget increase or   
$1M-$5M CMO Threat
5-10% Budget increase or   
$5M-10M CMO Threat
10-15% Budget increase or 
$10M-$60M CMO Threat
>15% Budget increase or 
>$60M CMO Threat; 
SCHEDULE -- Minor milestone slip Moderate milestone slip; Schedule margin available
Project milestone slip; No 
impact to a critical path
Major milestone slip; Impact to 
a critical path
Failure to meet critical 
milestones
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3 x 4 Test system maintenance ## 3 2 2 4 4 2
4 x 5  Mission essential resource limitations ## 4 4 5 2 1 4
4 x 3  Equipment End-of-Life ## 4 3 1 1 3
4 x 3  Building Refurbishments ## 4 3 3 1 1 2
5 x 5  Comm Systems End-of-Life ## 5 5 4 3 5 5
4 x 4 Building Maintenance Shortfall ## 4 3 3 4 2 2
3 x 4  Asbestos abatement ## 3 2 3 2 4 3
4 x 4  Core Capability Threat ## 4 4 3 1 4
4 x 4  Water System-Repairs/Upgrades ## 4 4 4 4 2 3
5 x 4  Research equipment failure threat ## 5 4 4 4Legend
 Top Center Risk (TCR)
 Proposed Top Center Risk (Proposed TCR)
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Process Hazard Analysis 






































• Worldwide industry and government organizations have developed 
effective indicator programs, recognizing the value of leading indicators at 
reducing the risk of catastrophic mishaps.
• In the US, events such as the BP Texas City explosion and the Deep 
Water Horizon spill have compelled action to develop a standard for 
process safety-related leading indicators.
• Examples of leading measure areas for high-risk systems include:
– Maintenance and system integrity conditions
– Operational qualifications
– Challenges to safety systems and monitoring equipment
– Communication and reporting system conditions
– Accuracy of configuration management
– Maintenance of operational procedures and emergency response plans 
• NASA has adapted this approach to assess risk controls associated with 
hazardous, critical, and complex infrastructure.
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Facility Safety Risk Concept of Operations

























































Chapter 10.4 are 













does not exist to 
support the 
requirements of 






does not meet the 
intent of Chapter 






















































































































































































Hazardous Industry at JSC
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High Score -> High Risk
Overall Risk Score Considers:
• Industry Hazard Index
• Weighted at 10%
• Hazard Deviation (JSC Mishap Rates)
• Weighted at 30%
• FBD Score (Risk Control)
• Weighted at 60%
Facility Risk Benchmarking with Insurance Industry
Comparative Risk of JSC Facilities
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• Accept risk only if it is low enough to tolerate 
and within regulations.
• NO ONE GETS HURT!!!
• Tolerate only the damage you can afford.
• Avoid risks you don’t NEED to take.
• Risks change as often as the facility, people, and 
processes associated with them, so they must be 
monitored and reassessed periodically.
Rules of Thumb for Managing Risk
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Backup Charts
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Columbia STS‐107, February 1, 2003:
• 7 fatalities; 
• $3 Billion vehicle loss;
• 2.5 year mission impact. 
Kalpana Chawla
Rick D. Husband
Laurel B. Clark
Ilan Ramon
Michael P. Anderson
David M. Brown
William C. McCool
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NOAA N‐Prime, September 6, 2003:
• $135 Million vehicle damage;
• 5.5 year mission impact. June 9, 2015 David T. Loyd
37
Genesis,  September 8, 2004:
• Some sample retrieval materials lost.
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Orbiting Carbon Observatory, 
February  24, 2009:
• $280 Million vehicle loss;
• 5+ year mission impact. 
Glory,  March 4, 2011:
• $424 Million vehicle loss;
• ??? mission impact. 
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JSC Chamber B Asphyxiation,
July 28, 2010
• Shoulder injury due to 
asphyxiation and fall.
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